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Abstract 
 
Planning policy aimed at preserving the viability of UK town centres halted the wave 
of out-of-town shopping centres – Schiller’s “third wave” of decentralisation. In 
consequence,  a number of major in-town shopping malls were developed in the UK. 
The first of these was the Oracle Centre in Reading. This paper examines the impact 
of the Oracle on retail activity in the town centre using land use data and the results 
of a retailer survey. The Oracle acted as a catalyst for change, accelerating trends 
already observed in the centre, shifting the prime pitch, weakening peripheral areas 
and increasing turnover rates. The added attraction of the town centre offset many of 
the trade diversion impacts. However, some adverse effects may have been masked by 
strong consumer spending and a vibrant local economy.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
Russell Schiller (1986) described the development of large, out-of-town regional 
shopping centres as the “third wave” of retail decentralisation in Britain.  Prior to the 
1980s, the only major shopping centre outside a town centre was Brent Cross.  
Planning policy however, shifted in the mid-1980s and a series of proposals for out-
of-town centres appeared, coinciding with a more laissez-faire approach and a 
presumption in favour of development.  Between 1986 and 1990, four more regional 
centres opened: the Metro Centre near Gateshead, Merry Hill near Dudley, Lakeside 
near Thurrock and Meadowhall in Sheffield.  These four centres together created over 
five million square feet (465,000 square metres) of new retail space. 
 
By the 1990s, it became evident that regional shopping centres were having 
significant negative impacts on surrounding town and district centres. Further, their 
out of town location (emphasising car travel) raised issues of environmental damage 
and social equality.  The 1990 White Paper This Common Inheritance introduced a 
more environmentally sensitive planning agenda – which, in turn, led to a series of 
revisions to Planning Policy Guidance Note Six.  The 1996 version of PPG6 brought 
in more stringent regulations on the size, location and type of retail development.  A 
key aim was to maintain the “vitality and viability” of existing town centres.  The 
guidance and application of the sequential test (forcing developers to demonstrate that 
no in-town locations were feasible) and the interaction with the town centre focused 
transport policy in PPG13 signalled the end of Schiller’s third wave.  Between 1997 
and 1999 five more major out of town centres opened: Bluewater, near Dartford; 
Cribbs Causeway, Bristol; White Rose near Leeds; the Trafford Centre, Greater 
Manchester; and Braehead, Glasgow.  However, planning permissions refusals such 
as that at Duxford, near Cambridge turned the focus back to town centres. 
 
Between 1999 and 2003, eight large in-town shopping centres opened in Britain (see 
Figure 1).  These centres provided some 6 million square feet (560,000 square metres) 
of retail and leisure space.  By 2001 CB Hillier Parker were reporting that over 90% 
of the shopping centre development pipeline was in town-centre located schemes, 
with 85% of sites under construction being in urban centres (CB Hillier Parker, 2001).  
These developments constituted a new wave of retail centralisation. 
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Figure 1 Major In-Town Shopping Centres 1999-2003 
Centre Location Year Opened Size (000sq ft) 
Buchanan Galleries Glasgow 1999 600 
The Chimes Uxbridge 2001 420 
Festival Place Basingstoke 2002 1,000 
The New Bullring Birmingham  2003 1,240 
The Oracle Reading 1999 700 
Overgate Centre Dundee 2000 462 
Touchwood Solihull 2001 650 
West Quay Southampton 2000 802 
Adapted from Oughton et al. (2003), Lowe (2005). 
 
The first of the new in-town centres to open was the Oracle Centre in Reading.  The 
centre occupies a site straddling the River Kennet, the bulk of which was formerly the 
Courage brewery.  Outline planning permission had originally been granted in 1982 
but the property slump of the early 1990s prevented development.  Site assembly 
began in 1994; the scheme passed through a number of developers until Hammerson 
acquired the rights in 1996.  Final agreement was reached in 1997, work starting that 
year.  Phase I was completed in September 1999, the Multiplex cinema opened later 
that year and the second phase opened in early 2001 providing a physical link to 
Broad Street, the traditional prime retail location in central Reading.  The £250 
million scheme has two major department store anchors, a further 90 shop units, 
sixteen bars and restaurants, a ten screen multiplex and car parking space for 2,300 
cars.  The new space has increased the retail offer in Reading town centre by about 
25%; as a result, the town rose from 26th to 13th in the Experian retail rankings1. 
 
There have been numerous studies of the impact of major out-of-town shopping 
centres, including work by Russell Schiller (for example), Schiller, 1985; Reynolds & 
Schiller, 1992; Schiller, 1996).  Research reveals major impacts on surrounding, pre-
existing retail centres.  Generally, studies find that the impacts on neighbouring town 
centres have been negative but while proximity to an out-of-town centre ‘tends to lead 
to a decline in a town centre’s ranking … the effect is complex.  The results confirm 
that successful town-centre redevelopment can go a long way to alleviate that effect 
(Schiller, 1996 p135).’  However, there are few examinations of the impact of the new 
wave of in-town centre development: exceptions include Oughton et al. (2003) and 
Lowe (2005). 
 
This paper extends the analysis of Oughton et al. (2003) in examining the impact of 
the Oracle on Reading town centre.  The focus is on the retail impact in the town 
itself, rather than on the position of Reading in the regional hierarchy of the impact on 
surrounding centres.  What happens to a town when a 700,000 square foot shopping 
and leisure centre opens adjacent to the traditional high street?  What are the spatial 
impacts?  Is the viability of fringe areas in the pre-existing retail core compromised?  
What happens to existing retailers and what is the balance between positive impacts 
from the magnet effect of the new mall and negative impacts from diversion of 
footfall. 
                                                 
1 Reading now faces greater local competition with the opening of Festival Place in Basingstoke and 
the proposed redevelopment of Bracknell town centre. It does, however, have strong accessibility and 
first mover advantages. 
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What effects are transitory, what effects longer lasting?  The paper attempts to address 
those issues by examining land use change in the town centre and by surveying 
retailers in the traditional core.  Inevitably, as time increases from the opening of the 
Oracle it is harder to distinguish effects that result from the shopping centre from 
broader urban and retailing trends.  However, an analysis of changes in the volume 
and characteristics of retail space provides valuable information on the planning and 
regeneration issues that emerge from such major downtown developments.  
 
The paper briefly reviews the available UK literature on the impact of major shopping 
centres on existing retail centres.  It then focuses on land-use change in Reading 
following the development and opening of the Oracle.  The results of a survey of 
retailers in the traditional centre are analysed and discussed.  Finally, policy 
implications and conclusions are set out. 
 
2. The Impact of Major Shopping Centre Developments   
 
Post hoc studies of retail development tend to seek to provide a statistical analysis of 
trading performance and economic and social impacts following the opening of a new 
centre.  As BDP and OXIRM (1992) observe, ‘relating events and trends directly to 
the effects of major new development may be problematic’ citing both lag effects, the 
noise from changing national and local economic environment and the pace of retail 
change.  Howard (1993) makes the distinction between the ‘early’ effects of trading 
and the emergence of a more mature phase: ‘changes associated with the new 
development and their effects are likely to continue for a considerable period in the 
future’ (ibid p98).  The further from the opening, the more the effect of confounding 
events and changing market environments may mask impacts. 
 
There are few documented studies of in-town shopping centre impact. Bennison & 
Davies (1980) studied the impact of Eldon Square in Newcastle City centre, which 
opened in 1976.  With respect to economic impacts, they note an increased 
concentration of activity, benefiting the principal shopping streets but damaging 
fringe areas.  In secondary streets, larger stores relocated to the centre or to spaces 
made available in prime areas, leaving the remaining, smaller, businesses vulnerable.  
While total trade in the city centre grew by an estimated 10-15%, trade loses in the 
traditional centre were considerable and changes to the patterns of shopping left 
certain areas isolated.  As the initial ‘shock effects reduced, some recovery was noted.  
However, there were geographical shifts in the prime area and uneven impacts, with 
smaller businesses and independents more adversely affected than larger retailers and 
multiples. 
 
More recently, Lowe (2005) has assessed the impacts of the West Quay development 
in Southampton.  Her approach is narrative in nature, focusing on the debates and the 
economic and planning processes that led to the acceptance and development of the 
800,000 square feet scheme (again developed by Hammerson).  Like the Oracle, West 
Quay won a BCSC award for design and has been used to market the town centre.  
Lowe emphasises both the re-branding of Southampton that followed the opening of 
West Quay and the regeneration aspects of the scheme.  She only considers the impact 
on the existing retail offer briefly noting that concerns regarding the impact of the 
new centre on existing shopping areas in the city have proved largely unfounded.   
 
 3
Although initial movements by some retail stores into West Quay left vacant shop 
units … these have subsequently been filled with new entrants (p459-460).  The 
argument here is that the expansion of retail activity in Southampton (which had been 
under pressure from competing centres and out-of-town developments) generated 
spill-over benefits for retailers outside the new mall. Lowe comments that her focus 
has been on the immediate economic impacts and on the image of Southampton as a 
retail destination.  She thus does not consider wider employment effects and economic 
spin-offs, nor any differential social impacts.  She cites Raco (2003), who provides a 
negative assessment of Reading’s Oracle: 
 
‘new forms of exclusion have emerged … the young, the elderly and those 
socially excluded and … from ethnic minority backgrounds have not been the 
targets for the new commercial developments’ (p15). 
 
Such criticisms have also been levelled at out-of-town centres where access is 
dominated by the car.  One feature of large, enclosed shopping centres is that, 
typically, landlords seek tenants with good covenants and prefer established chains to 
independents and local retailers.  Thus, the offer tends to be relatively homogenous.  
If the new centre damages the viability of fringe areas of the traditional town or 
neighbourhood centres in the urban area, variety may be lost which may have 
differential effects on particular social groups.  However, this should be assessed 
empirically, not simply asserted. 
 
There have been far more studies of the impact of out-of-town regional shopping 
centres.  These generally show trade diversion but a very uneven impact, dependent 
on the economic environment and the characteristics of the affected centre.  
Examining Brent Cross, the GLC (1980) found that trade diversion impacts were 
worse for medium sized centres with smaller, neighbourhood centres proving more 
robust.  Since the latter rely more on convenience shopping, they may have 
subsequently been damaged by the growth of grocery superstores.  Roger Tym and 
Partners (1993) find surprisingly similar results for Merry Hill despite the different 
economic and retailing environment.  They note particular adverse impacts on Dudley 
and Stourbridge.  For the former, they observe a loss of major multiples, an increase 
in vacancy rates, a marked reduction in shopping flows and falling rents.  They 
emphasise both the volume and the quality of retail activity. 
 
Howard & Davies’s (1993) Metro Centre study adds a further spatial dimension, 
noting that the effects are greater on the weaker parts of neighbouring centres.  For 
Newcastle City centre, they identify strong negative impacts in the southern 
peripheral streets (already damaged by the trading effects of Eldon Square, discussed 
above).  They note that some impacts would have been masked by retail growth at the 
time of opening.  Howard & Davies note a social polarisation in shopping trip 
behaviour – which is also observed for Meadowhall by Howard (1993) and OXIRM 
and Hillier Parker (1994).  This cannot entirely be attributed to a car ownership effect 
since Meadowhall is on Sheffield’s Super tram system.  Finally, Schiller (1996) offers 
empirical evidence of the impact of regional shopping centres on the retail ranking of 
surrounding towns.  For example, comparing 1984 to 1995 rankings, Newcastle 
(affected by the Metro Centre) fell from 8th to 15th;  Dudley (Merry Hill) from 74th  to 
209th; Sheffield (Meadowhall) from 9th to 23rd and Dagenham (Lakeside) from 307th 
to 541st. 
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From these studies, a number of common features emerge.  First, there are trade 
diversion effects, both between centres and within centres.  Within a centre, weaker 
and more peripheral streets suffer the greatest adverse impact, altering the shape of 
the prime and secondary retail areas.  Second, different types of retail activity exhibit 
different behaviours.  Comparison retailing (particularly when linked to major 
national multiple chains) tends to diverted to (or towards) the new centre.  Smaller 
businesses and local independents tend to remain in situ and are, hence, more 
vulnerable to trade and shopper flow diversions.  Those convenience functions that 
have remained in town centre locations tend to be less affected. Third, there are social 
polarisation effects in shopper behaviour – but these may be less in in-town locations, 
despite the homogeneity of retail offered in the new malls. 
 
Finally, the observed impacts depend critically on the economic and retailing 
environment and, accordingly, change over time as conditions change and as the 
impact of the new development stabilises and matures.  Are these features observable 
in Reading town centre?  The next section explores short- and medium-term changes 
to the land-use pattern following the opening of the Oracle .  
 
3.  Land Use and the Oracle 
 
To examine land use change in Reading, a database of retail space was established for 
the town centre – the definition of which was adapted from that employed by 
Experian Limited following discussions with the Town Centre Manager and property 
agents working in the local market. Occupancy data was taken from Goad Plans 
provided by Experian for 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2003. 1995 and 1997 
provides a pre-Oracle baseline; the 1998 results show the town centre during the 
construction phase and 1999 and 2000 reveal the position immediately after the 
opening of the shopping centre. Finally, 2003 allows for the processes of retail 
adjustment to stabilise.   
 
Each unit was classified according to business activity into eight groups: non-retail; 
comparison retail; convenience retail; service use; charity and discount retail; leisure; 
under development or refurbishment; vacant. For comparison and convenience retail, 
stores were further classified as being part of a large chain (defined as ten or more 
stores in multiple locations), a small chain (les than ten stores) or independent retailer. 
These classifications are adapted from Experian’s codings informed by the work of 
Schiller & Jarrett (1985), Reynolds & Schiller (1992) and Guy (1994). There are 
difficulties in measuring change across years as the physical configuration of retail 
units changes (shops being combined or split, upper or lower floors falling out of 
retail use or being brought back to market). The results presented here result from a 
process that aimed to produce as consistent a dataset as possible in the context of 
change in the marketplace. The figures shown here deliberately exclude the Oracle 
itself, except where units replace existing retail frontages, since the intention is to 
observe the impact of an in-town shopping centre on the retail structure of the rest of 
the market.  
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Figure 2: Occupation of Reading Town Centre Units, 1995-2003 
 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 
Non Retail 2% 1% 0% 2% 2% 2% 
Comparison 41% 40% 40% 39% 36% 34% 
Convenience 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Service 24% 22% 22% 22% 23% 25% 
Charity/Discount 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Leisure 7% 9% 10% 10% 11% 12% 
Development/Refurbishment 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 2% 
Vacant 16% 16% 13% 14% 15% 11% 
Demolished 0% 3% 5% 5% 5% 8% 
Not yet built 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 0% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Figure 2 shows the proportion of units by type of occupation from 1995 to 2003. The 
clearest trend in the town centre is the decline in comparison retailing, where the share 
of units has fallen by 17% over the period. The comparison offer in Reading as a 
whole has, of course, increased, since the Oracle is dominated by comparison shops. 
The only category in the town centre showing a clear gain is the leisure category – 
which consists largely of pubs, bars and clubs. The decline in the number of vacant 
units between 2000 and 2003 in part reflects the take up of space in Broad Street, 
originally vacated as occupiers moved into the Oracle development.  The decline is 
also partly the result of the demolition of redundant space for the construction of a 
supermarket (a sign of the increase in the amount of residential space in the town 
centre from conversion of leisure and office space).  
 
Within the comparison and convenience categories, other changes are evident. One is 
the decline of independent stores in the town centre (see Figure 3). However, this does 
not seem to be related to the Oracle, since the sharpest drop occurred between 1995 
and 1997, before construction commenced. There does seem to have been a further 
decline since the opening of the mall, however. Within the Oracle itself, there are very 
few independents (a subject of local political debate with the then member of 
parliament, Jane Griffiths arguing for a quota of local and independent stores), 
suggesting that there is a homogenisation of the town centre2. The proportion of 
comparison and convenience stores that are large chains has remained broadly 
constant over the analysis period while the proportion of small chains has increased, 
although none of these are in the prime locations. Within the prime retail areas of 
Broad Street, a number of the large chains that might be thought to be key attractors 
for the town centre have moved to the Oracle.   
 
Figure 3: Comparison and Convenience Stores: Chain Type 
 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 
Large Chain 49% 54% 53% 51% 51% 50% 
Small Chain 7% 9% 10% 9% 11% 13% 
Independent 44% 38% 37% 40% 38% 35% 
 
 
                                                 
2 A process argued to create “clone cities” or town centres ( Glendinning and Page, 1999; New 
Economic Foundation, 2004). 
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There is a spatial dimension to these changes. Figures 4 and 5 show land use in the 
traditional town centre in 1997 and 1999. The Oracle lies to the south west of the 
map; to the north is the railway station. The major east-west street to the south of the 
map is Broad Street, the traditional prime pitch. The major cross street to the north is 
Friar Street.  
 
< Figure 4 About Here> 
 
<Figure 5 About Here> 
 
The changing nature of the prime pitch can be seen in Figure 6 which shows the 
proportion of units by occupation in Broad Street. The share of comparison retailing 
in this street has declined by 13% since 1997, and the Oracle has been the catalyst for 
this.  Several retailers vacated their units in 1999 as they moved into the Oracle; hence 
the large number of vacancies, a situation previously unknown in the prime area.  At 
this point, the post-Oracle character of Broad Street had still to emerge. By 2003, after 
a period of vacancy or temporary occupation by discounters, these vacant units had 
largely become occupied, some with other mainstream comparison retailers but 
several of them became occupied by service occupiers such as banks and branded 
coffee bars.  This contributed to the marked increase in service occupiers from 2000 
to 2003, an increase that was augmented by a number of new units created within 
existing space and in the Oracle’s Broad Street frontage.  
 
Figure 6 : Occupation of Broad Street Units, 1995 to 2003 
 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 
Non Retail 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Comparison 73% 77% 76% 71% 68% 67% 
Convenience 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 4% 
Service 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 20% 
Charity/Discount 3% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 
Leisure 1% 3% 3% 1% 1% 1% 
Under Dev’ment/Refurb 3% 1% 3% 0% 0% 3% 
Vacant 3% 1% 1% 11% 8% 3% 
Demolished 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 
Not yet built 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 0% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Figure 7 shows that the predominance of the large multiples in Broad Street.  Apart 
from 2000, when temporary traders occupied recently vacated units, this position has 
been strengthened rather than weakened over the whole period.  
 
 
Figure 7 : Broad Street Comparison and Convenience Stores: Chain Type 
 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 
Large Chain 94% 96% 96% 98% 96% 98% 
Small Chain 0% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 
Independent 6% 2% 2% 2% 4% 2% 
Unknown 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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Broad Street has largely maintained the quality of its retailers, and the new service 
occupiers are those that are now often associated with prime pitches   There are a 
number of factors contributing to the resilience that the street has shown. First, the 
second phase of the Oracle opens out onto the Eastern end of the street. Second, the 
main entrances of two key attractors – Marks and Spencer and the John Lewis 
department store remain on Broad Street. Third, the area was already part 
pedestrianised and, once the Oracle opened, this was extended to the whole street with 
new street landscaping to enhance retail experience. The building works associated 
with Phase II of the Oracle and the street works inevitably disrupted pedestrian flow 
and the retail environment in the short term but this was a transitory effect. 
Nonetheless, there appear to be micro-locational changes with a decline in the quality 
of the retail at the western end of the street where major comparison goods stores have 
moved into the Oracle, to be replaced by weaker brands 
 
As can be discerned from the maps, in contrast to the relative success of Broad Street 
some of the peripheral streets in the area to the north of the map – Friar Street and the 
northern end of the linking streets - appears to have lost retail strength. They have 
seen an increase in vacant space, in charity stores and discounters and, in particular, in 
leisure.  Friar Street had, prior to The Oracle, benefited from the restricted supply of 
prime space in Broad Street; major retailers, unable to acquire space in the prime area, 
occupied several units here. However, the process of retail decline in Friar Street 
started in the early 1990s, at the same time that Broad Street was becoming 
pedestrianised. As retail units became vacant, many remained unoccupied while 
others became converted to A3, restaurants and cafes, and A4, drinking 
establishments. This concentration of drinking establishments in this area has raised 
planning issues relating to public disorder. The changes in the proportion of units by 
occupation in Friar Street is shown in Figure 8.  The marked drop in comparison 
retailing from 1995 to 1997 with a corresponding increase in both vacant units and in 
the leisure sector is clear.  Between 2000 and 2003, the number of vacancies fell 
sharply as units were taken for comparison retailing and for leisure.  However, that 
the opening of the Oracle has accelerated a decline in retail stature can be seen in 
figure 9; the large multiples have departed and the retail space that remains is now 
largely occupied by independent shops and small chains. 
 
Figure 8  Occupation of Friar Street Units, 1995-2003  
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 
Non Retail 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 
Comparison 41% 32% 30% 30% 27% 31% 
Convenience 5% 5% 4% 5% 6% 6% 
Service 28% 24% 26% 28% 29% 27% 
Charity/Discount 4% 2% 5% 5% 6% 7% 
Leisure 6% 13% 15% 15% 15% 19% 
Under Dev/Refurb 4% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 
Vacant 11% 24% 19% 14% 14% 7% 
Demolished 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Not yet built 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Figure 9 : Friar Street Comparison and Convenience Stores: Chain Type 
Friar Street: Chains and Independents
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Large Chain Small Chain Independent
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003
 
 
The rate of change in type of occupation within Reading retail (excluding the Oracle) 
has been very consistent over the analysis period, averaging around 11% of units per 
year. Change peaked between 1997 and 1998 in the development phase and has 
subsequently stabilised, with only around 9% of units per annum changing use in the 
2000-2003 period. Similarly, the shift away from independents to small and large 
chains largely predated the opening of the Oracle with 8% of units moving from 
independent to chain occupation in the period 1995-1997. Thereafter, change has been 
minimal (although this, in part, reflects the small number of independent retail traders 
remaining in the centre of Reading. This should not, however, be taken as an indicator 
of stability in the market. Between 2000-2003, some 30% of units experienced a 
change of occupier (whether in the same retail category or representing a change of 
type). Some of this reflected the take-up of vacated units in Broad Street although, 
given the nature of leases and businesses, much of this change was concentrated in the 
fringe and secondary areas of the town centre.  Such turnover rates are not necessarily 
an indicator of town centre weakness (given no accompanying increase in vacancy 
rates) but may point to vulnerability to a retail downturn, particularly in the peripheral 
parts of the town centre. 
 
4. The Impact of the Oracle on Retailers  
 
To assess the impact of the Oracle on retailers in the town centre, a questionnaire 
survey was undertaken after the opening of the second phase of the Centre. The 
survey sought to identify impacts of the new mall on turnover and the attitudes of 
retailers towards the Oracle. The design of the survey drew on instruments used in 
prior impact studies, notably Howard and Davies’s (1993) assessment of the Metro 
Centre impact. In particular, questions on turnover are framed in terms of relative 
change rather than monetary value: “retailers are more willing to give (qualitative 
assessments) while being reluctant to provide more quantitative data about their 
performance” (Bennison & Davies, 1980, 64); “it has been found that … a direct 
question about absolute turnover brings a very poor response” (Howard & Davies, 
1993, 115).  
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To correct for seasonal variations in sales volumes, retailers were asked to compare 
sales in a particular quarter with sales in the same quarter a year previous. Where a 
shop formed part of a chain, respondents were asked to compare the Reading retail 
experience with other stores in the South East region as a way of separating the 
impacts of the new shopping centre from wider consumer trends.  
 
The land use database described in the previous section formed the sampling base for 
the survey. Initially, stores coded as convenience or comparison were selected. Next, 
all units that had experienced a change of occupier between 1998 and 2000 were 
excluded. This creates a survivorship bias in that stores most adversely affected by the 
advent of the Oracle may have closed. However, this may be partially offset by 
stronger stores relocating to the new shopping centre. A total of 161 questionnaires 
were distributed; 31 were returned, an overall response rate of 19%. This, relatively 
low,  response rate is not atypical for this kind of survey and may be explained in part 
by the sensitive nature of the data required as well as the fact that the information 
required would not be immediately accessible to all respondents.  Some managers 
who did not return the survey form agreed to a brief interview providing additional 
contextual information for the analysis. Figure 10 breaks the sample down by store 
type: the proportions are not statistically different from the overall distribution of 
stores in 2000.  Responses came from all the main shopping areas, although only two 
responses were from Broad Street: therefore the results largely represent the views of 
occupiers in secondary locations. 
 
Figure 10  Survey Respondents: Store Type 
Larger Chain 
45%
Small Chain 
16%
Independent 
Business 
39%
 
 
Respondents were asked to assess the changes in sales volumes on a quarterly basis 
following the opening of the Oracle. Figure 11 reports the responses of the 
comparison retailers. Since volumes were assessed in nominal terms, a “zero change” 
response represents a small real decline in turnover. For each quarter by quarter 
comparison, a majority of retailers reported a decline in sales after the opening of the 
Oracle: an average of 57% reporting falls. For each quarter, over 40% reported falls of 
5% or more.  
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However, some 20% of retailers, in various locations, reported relative increases in 
sales in each quarter. In almost all cases, retailers experiencing a fall in one quarter 
experienced a relative fall in the next quarter: in only one case did the respondent 
report initial falls followed by subsequent gains. 
 
Figure 11 Turnover Change Quarter by Quarter 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Q4/98 - Q4/99
Q1/99 - Q1/00
Q2/99 - Q2/00
Q3/99 - Q3/00
Sales Volume Change After Oracle Opening
Decreased >10% Decreased 5-10% Decreased <5% No Change
Increased <5% Increased 5-10% Increased >10%
 
It cannot necessarily be concluded that the  reported falls in sales volume are solely a 
consequence of the opening of the Oracle as the falls might be a result of factors, 
either inside or outside of the control of the individual stores.  They may reflect 
changes in the patterns of consumer spending over the period. Government statistics 
show non-food retail spending increasing in each of the four pairs of quarters – by an 
average of 4%. However, that is a national aggregate and may mask falls in sales in 
particular segments of the market. As a result, those comparison retailers that were 
part of a chain were asked to assess the performance of their Reading stores with other 
stores in the South East. Results are shown in Figure 12.  
 
In each of the comparison quarters, at least one third of the Reading stores surveyed 
experienced worse performance than their other regional stores – with few stores 
reporting superior performance (other than in the fourth quarter of 1999 when 20% 
reported superior sales). Those stores reporting quarter-on-quarter declines in sales in 
Reading were much more likely to report poor performance relative to others in the 
region than those reporting increased sales. The implication, then, is that for many 
stores in the traditional town centre, the opening of the Oracle had a detrimental 
impact on retail performance in immediate aftermath, sales diversion dominating any 
increase in footfall from the attraction effects of the new shopping centre. These 
results, of course, relate only to those stores that were operating in the town centre 
both before and after the development of the Oracle and are subject to the survivor 
and mover biases outlined above.  
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Figure 12  Relative Performance of Reading Stores in the Region 
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A clear majority of retailers who had experienced a decline in sales volume attributed 
this fall to the opening of the Oracle. Nearly 80% attributed the quarter four 1999 fall 
to the opening (Figure 13). Over time that proportion falls back to less than 60% by 
the third quarter of 2000. The second most frequently cited cause was pedestrian flow 
change. This has two components, both associated with the Oracle. The first comes 
from disruption resulting from the building, pedestrianisation and street landscaping 
work – a transitory impact (although street works in Broad Street continued through 
2001). The second results from the alteration of the structure of the town centre and 
predominant movement patterns: this may be a permanent impact. Street works and 
traffic/parking also feature as commonly cited factors. The opening of the Oracle 
provided an additional 2,300 car parking spaces in central Reading. However, 
discussions with retailers indicated that some felt that the new provision further 
distorted footfall, harming certain locations. There were also concerns that, despite the 
new provision, queues and traffic volume might deter shoppers. Few retailers cited 
general economic or external competitive factors that were not linked to the Oracle. 
 
For the smaller number of retailers experiencing sales increases, around half attributed 
the growth to the opening of the Oracle – slightly less than the proportion citing 
consumer trends and the state of the economy. However, around 75% suggested that 
the increases were as a result of new firm marketing strategies. The contextual 
information collected suggested that some of these new strategies were a response to 
the arrival of the Oracle. Within an existing unit, there is a limit to the amount of 
floorspace change that is possible. However, a number of stores had changed their 
product lines to differentiate themselves from Oracle-based competitors: a bookstore 
opening a large children’s section, an electrical store selling more high added value, 
specialist products and reducing the shelf space for standardised items offered by the 
chain retailers in the mall itself. Other stores had put in place a more aggressive 
marketing strategy to increase visibility and to distinguish themselves from the 
perceived homogeneity of the offer in the Oracle. These strategies rely on a spillover 
effect from the attractiveness of the Oracle as a retail destination.  
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Figure 13  Reasons for the Decline in Sales 
Explaining Sales Decreases
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The detailed comments provided by the retail managers identify a number of recurrent 
themes. The opening of the Oracle significantly altered pedestrian flow in the existing 
town centre, due to the attraction of the Oracle itself; the relocation of key “magnet” 
stores from the traditional town centre to the Oracle or to the east of the old core to be 
closer to the entrances to the new shopping mall; and the provision of new car parking 
spaces to the south of the town centre. In turn, this pedestrian diversion has affected 
footfall and, in consequence, turnover. Independent traders also argues that the advent 
of the Oracle had led to a hardening of attitudes in favour of multiples by landlords. 
Interviews with property agents and the town centre manager had suggested that, even 
though the Oracle itself would be dominated by national and international chains, 
there would be opportunities for independents and specialist retailers in vacated units 
and in secondary areas. Independent traders argued that, even in these units, landlords 
seemed unwilling to let and were demanding rents and service charges that were 
beyond the immediate means of many retailers 
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Figure 14: Retailer Comments on Pedestrian Flow 
Since the Oracle opened the retailers in our shopping centre moved out to 
locations on the other side of town.  
 
An issue which compounded our drop in sales and footfall was the relocation of 
HMV from [near] to us into the Oracle.  HMV was a destination store and it 
brought a large footfall onto Friar Street.  A large percentage of our lost sales 
and footfall was due to this move.  We were no longer placed in a convenient 
position for customers to come to us, a special trip had to be made.  
We have noticed less business from "passing trade" presumably through reduced 
footfall in Friar Street.  Also we have seen less new customers under 30, maybe 
because the Oracle is now "the" place to shop.  
 
The opening of the Oracle shifted the whole of the retail especially clothing to 
another part of town and although this brought new people to Reading, if your 
premises is off the main streets you were getting none of the new custom and 
losing your old custom.  
 
Another consequence of the arrival of the Oracle has been the impact on retail 
employment. The contingent conditions here are critical. In common with much of the 
Thames Valley region, Reading has very low unemployment and, consequently, an 
increase in local employment as a result of the major increase in retail space places 
pressure on recruitment and wages. This has been a long standing problem in the 
Reading area but a problem that has been exacerbated by the arrival of the Oracle. 
The impact of rising wage levels and recruitment difficulties is perceived to fall 
disproportionately on independent traders.  
 
Figure 15  Retailer Comments on Recruitment 
“Recruitment has become more difficult in an already difficult situation.  Pay 
rates have risen.”  
 
“Recruitment has also become more difficult.  We compete with retail for staff and 
the Oracle may be a more attractive place to work.  However, in the last month 
[summer 2001] we have noticed this has eased somewhat - the reason being staff 
do not want to work evenings and Sundays, we do not open at these times.”  
 
“The Oracle has effected recruitment, it has become a very competitive job 
market.” 
 
“We have also been effected with staff numbers, not getting as many applicants 
due to the Oracle.”  
 
The survey examined the impact of the Oracle on the traditional town centre in the 
year following opening and hence highlights the immediate impacts of the 
development of a major in-town shopping centre. To an extent, the results mirror 
those of the land-use analysis, pointing to a shift in the spatial structure of the town 
centre south and east, with problems experienced in the more peripheral, fringe areas.  
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The majority of retailers surveyed experienced a fall in turnover, both absolute and 
relative to other regional stores: attributed to the change in pedestrian flows and to 
competition from the new mall. Those that did not had, typically, adopted strategies to 
counter the impacts of the Oracle or to differentiate themselves from the Oracle’s 
offer. However, independent and specialist traders did not appear to have benefited 
from a shift of national chains into or near to the Oracle. Upward pressure on rents 
and wages and reported reluctance by landlords to let available space to independent 
traders hindered the development of a more varied retail offer in the traditional town 
area. 
 
5. The Impact of the Oracle: Tentative Conclusions 
 
This paper represents a preliminary attempt to assess the impact of the development of 
a major in-town shopping centre on the retail structure of the existing town centre. 
Any such analysis is beset with difficulties. First, there is no counter-factual: what 
would have happened without the development? The sale value comparisons of 
multiple/chain retailers in Reading with their other regional stores is an attempt to 
provide a relative analysis. Second, the impacts are inevitably contingent. The 
development of the Oracle took place in the context of strong economic growth and 
steadily increasing consumer expenditure nationally and it occurred in a town with a 
vibrant economic base with high per capita income, low unemployment and upward 
pressure on wages. Third, the impact considered is short-term. The more recent land-
use results show the town centre after the “shock” adjustments resulting from the 
Oracle have dissipated. However, the patterns and distributions are a product not only 
of the Oracle but also of secular retail trends and changes in the local economic 
environment. It becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle the impacts of the new 
shopping centre from other, confounding factors. Nonetheless, the study generates 
results that help understanding of the likely impacts of similar developments in other 
towns and cities resulting from urban planning policies.  
 
It is inevitable that a development like the Oracle will have a spatial impact on a town 
centre. The Oracle “pulled” the retail focus of the town centre to the south and east. 
This reinforced pre-existing trends that were weakening the retail offer to the north of 
the town centre and accelerated the conversion of retail space to pubs and bars, 
particularly in and around Friar Street.  The pedestrianisation of the remainder of 
Broad Street, leaving Friar Street as the main thoroughfare for the town’s buses and 
other permitted traffic, accentuated the gulf between Friar Street and the main retail 
areas.  The arrival of the Oracle acted as a catalyst, accelerating changes that were 
already in train.  
 
Independent retailers have argued that the opening of the Oracle made it harder for 
them to obtain leases in the town centre. The land-use results do not fully back this – 
much of the fall in the proportion of independent and specialist traders seems to have 
occurred prior to the Oracle development.  Since the Oracle opened the independents 
have lost share to the small chains, not the large multiples.  In the town centre, the 
proportion of large multiples has remained relatively stable. However, these aggregate 
figures mask a change in the nature of those multiples; key, magnet, shops have 
moved from locations that are secondary or just off prime to be in or near to the 
Oracle.  These have been replaced by brands that have less attraction for shoppers and 
that generate less multiplier effects for surrounding stores.  
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Nonetheless, there does not seem to have been a significant increase in vacancies even 
in the peripheral parts of the traditional town centre. Vacant units have been relet – 
although not always for A1 retail usage. This might suggest that the additional footfall 
in Reading generated by the attraction of the Oracle (and the upward shift of Reading 
in the retail hierarchy) has counteracted any trade diversion and competition effects – 
that there are sufficient spillover effects to maintain the traditional town centre 
alongside the mall. This, however, is a function of the strength of consumer spending 
and the local economy and it would be unwise to suggest that an in-town retail 
development does not weaken fringe areas. The high turnover rate, with more than 
10% of stock changing use or occupation each year is an indicator of vulnerability to a 
cyclical downturn in retail markets.  
 
The great majority of town centre retailers surveyed experienced a real decline in 
sales volume in the year after the opening of the Oracle – a fall that could not be 
attributed to general trends in consumer spending in the region. The shop managers 
largely attributed this to Oracle effects – trade diversion, changes in pedestrian flows 
and disruption effects. Some of these impacts may be transitory - for example, the 
construction, pedestrianisation and street landscaping works and temporary vacancies 
while retailers relocated into the Oracle. Others, notably the spatial reconfiguration of 
dominant shopper patterns and the loss of comparison retail in the north of the town 
centre, are permanent changes.  
 
In a region with a strong economy and high employment levels, the development of 
an in-town shopping centre will alter the labour market and put upward pressure on 
wages. Survey work and interviews suggested that the impacts were felt most keenly 
by independent retailers and smaller units in the fringe and secondary areas of the 
town centre. This creates an additional pressure for independent retailers, alongside 
the difficulty of obtaining leases and issues linked to rents and service charges, 
contributing to the homogenisation of the retail offer – unless and until there is a 
change in consumer attitudes and a resurgence of interest in specialist retailers.  
 
In summary, many of the impacts observed in Reading echo those found in studies of 
out-of-town shopping centres. However, they are more muted because the externality 
benefits of the in-town mall – in particular, the spillover effects from the enhanced 
attractiveness of the town centre as a whole and the overall increase in shopping trips 
– counteract the negative competitiveness effects. However, the spatial impacts found 
in out-of-town impact studies do occur in an in-town context. In particular, fringe 
areas are weakened, with a downgrading of the quality of retail outlet and a loss of A1 
retail space. This makes these fringe areas much more vulnerable to retail shocks – for 
example, a sharp downturn in consumer expenditure or competition from 
neighbouring towns.  
 
There are other aspects of the development of major in-town shopping centres that 
merit study. These include the impact on retail in surrounding towns in the hinterland 
of the host city and at the same level in the retail hierarchy; the impact on 
neighbourhood centres in the outer parts of the town and the social access 
implications of such changes; and further analysis of the labour market and wider 
economic implications of the development. The intention here has been to focus on 
the impact of retail structure within the town centre itself.  
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The in-town shopping centre is advocated as a key tool in maintaining urban vitality 
and viability. Undoubtedly, the in-town centre has a more muted impact than an out-
of-town centre. Nonetheless, the Reading experience suggests that alongside the 
positive benefits, there are negative impacts and that fringe retail areas are weakened 
by such developments.  
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Figure 4: Land Use in Reading Town Centre 1997 
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Figure 5: Land Use in Reading Town Centre, 1999 
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